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JUDICIAL ALTERATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
WATER POLLUTION STANDARDS
There is a movement in environmental law to make administrative
agencies more accountable for their decisions, more responsive to
the complaints of the individual citizen and conservationist groups.
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970 (EPA) 1 reflects
that movement by allowing Michigan citizens to initiate environmen-
tal law enforcement through the judicial system.2 (Previously, citizens
had to rely solely on complaints to administrative agencies.) The Act
is unique, however, in the degree of control and type of intervention
it permits courts to exercise over decisions made by Michigan's ad-
ministrative agencies.
A recent decision, Lakeland Property Owners Association v. North-field Township,3 was the first EPA case in which a Michigan circuit
court utilized the broad relief powers granted it under the Act4 to
rewrite pollution standards fixed by a state environmental agency.,
In Lakeland, defendant township was piping inadequately treated
sewage into a river upstream from plaintiffs. Plaintiffs challenged this
operation of defendant's water treatment plant, presenting evidence
that the receiving waters were polluted and would remain so despite
compliance with the State's Water Resources Commission (WRC)
standards.6 Plaintiffs also contested a proposed enlargement of the
1. Micr. STAT. ANN. §§ 14.528(201)-(207) (Supp. 1973).
2. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Supp. 1973).
3. 3 ERG 1893 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1971).
4. McCH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Supp. 1973) states:
(2) In granting relief provided by subsection (1) where there is involved
a standard for pollution or for an anti-pollution device or procedure, fixedby rule or otherwise, by an instrumentality or agency of the state or a political
subdivision thereof, the court may:(a) Determine the validity, applicability and reasonableness of the
standard.(b) When a court finds a standard to be deficient, direct the adoption
of a standard approved and specified by the court.
5. The Water Resources Commission involved in this case is given primary
responsibility for regulating effluent levels in State waters. McH. STAT. ANN. §§
3.521-3.532 (1969). Section 3.522 provides in part: "The commission shall ...
have control of the pollution of . .. waters of the state . . . which arc or may
be affected by waste disposal of municipalities ......
6. 3 ERC at 1896-7.
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treatment plant and sought a restraining order against any expansion. 7
The trial judge ruled that effluent standards even more restrictive
than those set by the WRC were required if pollution was to be pre-
vented,8 and that by authority of EPA section 2(2) (a) & (b), he could
direct the WtRC to adopt a different pollution standard. The court
then specified a new standard to be adopted by the WRC and met by
defendant before it could expand its plant.0 The court summarily
rejected defendant's assertion that EPA section 2 (2) was an unconsti-
tutional delegation of legislative power, granting courts too much con-
trol over administrative agency decisions.O
The United States Constitution contains no specific provision that
the three kinds of governmental power, executive, legislative and
judicial, must be kept separate, but the Supreme Court in 1881 felt
strict separation was essential to our system of government. 11 Since
then, concern for adequate checks and balances has replaced insistence
7. Id. at 1895-96.
8. When suit was filed, defendant sought a remand to the WRO, alleging that
plaintiffs could challenge the WRC's standards only by appeal to that Commis-
sion. The court denied this motion, citing the discretionary power given it under
the EPA. M¢IlCH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202)(1) (Supp. 1973) states: "[A]ny
person . . . or other legal entity may maintain an action in the circuit court
having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for
declaratory and equitable relief . . . ." MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(204) (2)(Supp. 1973) states: "If administrative, licensing or other proceedings are re-
quired or available to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the
court may remit the parties to such proceedings .... "
Defendant then returned to the WRC, which issued a revised and more
stringent order after a rehearing that was boycotted by plaintiffs. Amended Final
Order of Determination, Water Resources Commission Proceedings Against the
Township of Northfield for Abatement of Pollution of the Horseshoe Drain and
the Huron River, No. 1478 (March 18, 1971). The revised order was placed in
evidence at the trial, but the judge held that even compliance with the new
standards was not satisfactory.
9. 3 ERC at 1902. The court's new standards made only two minor quantita-
tive changes in the WRC order and added two additional requirements that
were relatively insignificant. Amended Final Order of Determination, Water Re-
sources Commission Proceedings Against the Township of Northfield for Abate-
ment of Pollution of the Horseshoe Drain and the Huron River, No. 1478 (March
18, 1971).
10. 3 ERC at 1901.
11. Kilborn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190-91 (1881); see Parker v. Kennedy,
212 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Louisville Provision Co. v. Glenn, 18 F.
Supp. 423 (W.D. Ky. 1937); People v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 367 Il1. 260,
11 N.E.2d 408 (1937).
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on strict separation,12 with the result that legislative and adjudica-
tory power,13 as well as executive functions,14 may be conferred upon
administrative agencies. There has been more reluctance to allow
the delegation of non-judicial powers, especially legislative powers,
to the courts,1 5 but the doctrine of separation of powers is rarely in-
yoked to prevent such delegation, because of the difficulty of drawing
the line between judicial and legislative responsibility. A presumption
of constitutionality is generally afforded any delegation of power by
the legislature,1 6 so courts tend to characterize most delegations as
consistent with judicial responsibility.
Michigan initially favored a strict separation of powers.17 The
State constitution 8 was held to preclude the legislature from delegat-
ing its lawmaking powers to another body. 0 Increasingly, however,
Michigan courts have resorted to characterizing a delegated power
as something other than the authority to make, alter or repeal law,P0
12. K. DAvis, ADMImISTRATIVE LAW TaxT 24-25 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIs].
13. Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., 318 U.S. 163 (1943);
Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940).
14. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935). Such powers
were believed necessary if the agencies were to serve as adjuncts through which
the legislature, ill-suited for handling masses of detail, could implement its policies.
15. Buback v. Romney, 380 Mich. 209, 156 N.W.2d 549 (1968); Goethal v.
Board of Supervisors, 361 Mich. 104, 104 N.W.2d 794 (1960) (any attempt to
vest courts with legislative authority is invalid); Johnson v. Kramer Bros. Freight
Lines, Inc., 357 Mich. 254, 98 N.W.2d 586 (1959) (in absence of constitutional
provisions to the contrary, legislature may not confer non-judicial powers on the
judiciary); Cicotte v. Damron, 345 Mich. 528, 77 N.W.2d 139 (1956) (judicial
usurpation of functions of an administrative body is forbidden by the constitution).
16. State v. Watts, 186 N.W.2d 611 (Iowa 1971); State v. Stenhoek, 182
N.W.2d 377 (Iowa 1970); see Annot., 79 L.Ed. 474, 484-87 (1935).
17. Dearborn Township v. Dail, 334 Mich. 673, 55 N.W.2d 201 (1952).
18. Mcn. CoNST. art. IV, § 1 directs that "The legislative power of the State
of Michigan is vested in a senate and a house of representatives." This was
interpreted as confiding the exclusive authority to make, alter, or repeal laws to
the legislature. Harsha v. City of Detroit, 261 Mich. 586, 246 N.W. 849 (1933).
19. O'Brien v. State Highway Comm'r, 375 Mich. 545, 134 N.W.2d 700
(1965); Chemical Bank & Trust Co. v. Oakland County, 264 Mich. 673, 251
N.W. 395 (1933); King v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co., 140 Mich. 258, 103 N.W.
616 (1905).
20. If a delegated power can be characterized as involving the interpretation
or implementation of legislative policy, it is recognized to be within the legitimate
scope of judicial power. Buback v. Romney, 380 Mich. 209, 156 N.W.2d 549
(1968); Johnson v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc., 357 Mich. 254, 98 N.W.2d
586 (1959).
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the traditional designation of a legislative power. This practice is
consistent with the presumption of constitutionality adopted by the
State's courts. 21
Two doctrines are employed in Michigan to prevent undue or un-
timely judicial infringement upon the administrative realm: the
primary jurisdiction doctrine, which governs whether a court or
agency should make the initial decision in a particular case, and the
doctrine of exhaustion, which governs the timing of judicial review.
The primary jurisdiction doctrine2 2 provides that where agencies
have been created by the legislature to regulate a subject matter at
issue, court action should be postponed until that agency renders a
decision on the issue.23 Judicial appraisal of the need or lack of need
to resort to administrative judgment or fact-finding often determines
whether the doctrine is applicable.24
According to the exhaustion doctrine, courts should not ordinarily
review factual decisions of administrative bodies until an aggrieved
party has first pursued all available administrative review.23 Before
exhaustion is required, a remedy must be obtainable from the ad-
ministrative agency." In addition, the rule is not imposed if exhaus-
tion would be a waste of time,2 7 e.g., when the agency has ruled on
the issue and is unlikely to change its mind.
In Lakeland, the primary jurisdiction doctrine was satisfied be-
cause the administrative agency responsible for resolving the issue
21. People v. Victor, 287 Mich. 506, 283 N.W. 666 (1939); People v. Bandy,
35 Mich. App. 53, 192 N.W.2d 115 (1971).
22. See generally 3 K. DAvIs, ADmINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §§ 19.01-09
(1958); Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationalizations, 65
YALE L.J. 315 (1956); Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARv. L. REV. 1037
(1964).
23. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1952). See also
United States v. Western Pac. RR., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
24. DAvis 381.
25. United States v. Collins, 339 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Mich. 1972). Although
the doctrine is mentioned approvingly in court opinions, exceptions to its applica-
tion are frequently found. DAvIs 382-92.
26. Trever v. City of Sterling Heights, 37 Mich. App. 594, 195 N.W.2d 91
(1972); Schwall v. City of Dearborn, 31 Mich. App. 169, 187 N.W.2d 543
(1971). See also Trojan v. Township of Taylor, 352 Mich. 636, 639, 91 N.W.2d
9 (1958); Welfare Employees Union v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 28 Mich. App. 343,
348-49, 184 N.W.2d 247, 249-50 (1970).
27. Welfare Employees Union v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 28 Mich. App. 343, 348-
49, 184 N.W.2d 247, 249-50 (1970).
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had rendered its decision prior to judicial involvement. Court action
preceded exhaustion of all administrative remedies, however, since
no appeal was made of the WRC order of determination.28 Plaintiffs
argued that the exhaustion doctrine did not apply because they had
not been parties to the original proceedings before the WRC. Cer-
tainly, though, they were free to intervene in the original WRC ac-
tion and make themselves parties.29 Thus, the issue arises whether a
plaintiff can skirt the exhaustion doctrine by refusing to participate
in the original administrative proceedings relevant to his complaint.
The judge in Lakeland avoided this issue by taking original jurisdic-
tion of Lakeland's complaint as authorized by the EPA, rather than
taking judicial review of the administrative agency's decision30
In Lakeland, once the regulatory agency's standards were found to
be deficient, the court proceeded to set what it felt were better stand-
ards instead of remanding the case to the agency for new standards.
That action was consistent with the court's statutory authority under
EPA section 2 (b), but the wisdom of courts undertaking to set quan-
titative standards is questionable, as is the constitutionality of dele-
gating such authority to the courts.
With respect to the wisdom of setting quantitative standards, there
is certainly more and more pressure on courts to intervene in the
administrative process. Some persons suggest that the nature of en-
vironmental rights, i.e., the irrevocability of their breach, justifies
broader and deeper court review.31 Skepticism that present institu-
tions can effectively balance opposing priorities prevails, and active
judicial involvement is seen as the only means of effecting any sig-
nificant change in agency policy decisions.3 2 While more involvement
28. An agency may order a rehearing in a contested case on its own motion
or on request of a party. MicE. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(187) (Supp. 1973).
29. The Administrative Procedure Act's notice provisions are designed to try
to insure that any person likely to be affected by a ruling shall be allowed the
chance to participate. MICE. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(141), (142) (Supp. 1973).
30. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (Supp. 1973). The judge declared that
his action was not judicial review, because plaintiffs were not appealing the
WRO order but were attacking the future conduct of Northfield that would be
based on that order.
31. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness o1
Administrative Law, 70 COLu a. L. REv. 612, 643 (1970). But ef. Comment,
The Role of the Judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of Environ.
mental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1070, 1077 (1970).
32. Note, Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, 4 J.L. REFORM
121, 121-122 (1970); see Sive, supra note 31, at 615, 650; Comment, Private
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may be necessary and appropriate, Lakeland suggests care should be
taken as to the extent of judicial involvement. 33 Courts do not have
the resources nor the time to conduct the fact-finding and technical
evaluation necessary to set quantitative standards.3 4 This conclusion
was reached by the Supreme Court when, taking note of the complex
scientific issues inherent in so much environmental litigation, the
Court expressed concern about the potential drain on court resources
and the difficulties of fact-finding, and suggested that courts not take
too much of such fact-finding upon themselves.35
As for the constitutionality of delegating the power to set quantita-
tive standards, the defense in Lakeland argued that section 2 (b) of
the EPA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.38
Another Michigan circuit court in Roberts v. Michigan3 7 an earlier
EPA case, accepted that argument. That court concluded that under
section 2 (b) it was "being called upon to make law [a legislative
power that cannot be delegated] when, after determining the stand-
ards to be deficient (in relation to pollution arising from the use of
Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. L. RYv. 734, 735, 752 (1970). The
Michigan Emironmental Protection Act was drawn in response to the apparent
inability of Michigan environmentalists to obtain adequate relief from administra-
tive agencies. Note, Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 J.L. REFORBI 358,
360 (1970).
33. David Sive suggests that most important questions in environmental cases
call more for the skill of judges than of administrative agencies. Sive, supra note
31, at 629-630. He may be right about policy issues like the relative social value
of jeopardized resources and the balance of economic and social interests but the
setting of quantitative standards necessary to implement public policy presents
greater problems of competency. Perhaps Professor Davis has the best answer
when he proposes that the degree of judicial review should vary according to the
scientific complexity of the question and the comparative qualifications of the
agency and the courts. The more technical an issue, the better it would be for the
court to defer to the agency's superior ability to determine proper quantitative
standards. 4 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 30.09, at 241 (1958).
34. One might argue that administrative agencies should serve as investigative
adjuncts for the judiciary in these cases, but that was not the legislative intent. See
Note, Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 J.L. REFORM 358, 365-66
(1970).
35. "The notion that appellate judges, even with the assistance of a most
competent Special Master, might appropriately undertake at this time to unravel
these complexities is, to say the least, unrealistic." Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem.
Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 504 (1971).
36. 3 ERC at 1900.
37. 2 ERG 1612 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, -Mich. App.-,
206 N.W.2d 466 (1973).
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motor vehicles), it is then to 'direct the adoption of a standard ap-
proved and specified by the court.' "33
Plaintiff in Roberts, concerned about the adequacy of Michigan's
auto air pollution regulations, had sued the Secretary of State, alleg-
ing that the Secretary violated the EPA by granting licenses to operate
polluting vehicles. Plaintiff sought to have the licensing and operating
of all motor vehicles enjoined until adequate standards were estab-
lished and enforced. The judge refused to grant the requested relief
sought under EPA section 2, and held that section 2 was an uncon-
stitutional delegation of power, because the power to make, alter,
amend, and repeal laws was nondelegable to the courts. 9
Initially, Roberts and Lakeland would seem to be in conflict, in that
one says the legislature can delegate to the judiciary the power to set
new standards, and the other says the legislature can not.40 The cases
may be reconciled, however, because the issue in Roberts revolved
around automotive pollution standards set by statute, whereas Lake-
land involved standards set by an administrative agency. The EPA
section 2 (2) empowers a trial court to rewrite pollution standards
"fixed by rule or otherwise, by an instrumentality or agency of the
state or a political subdivision thereof."41 "Or otherwise," when read
under the rule of ejusdem generis,42 suggests standards fixed by
regulation, order, resolution, etc., but not those fixed by statute or a
constitution. On that basis, the language of section 2 (2) would not
authorize the changing of standards fixed by a statute, and the Roberts
decision not to grant relief would be correct. The result in Roberts
is thereby reconciled with Lakeland, because courts by the language
in section 2 (2) are empowered to change administrative standards.43
38. Id. at 1614.
39. Id.
40. The Lakeland court did not try to resolve the conflict. Instead it stated
that Roberts was not controlling since the holding had been restricted to the
question of pollution from motor vehicles, and that any dispute between the
circuits would have to be decided on the appellate level. 3 ERC at 1901.
41. Note 4 supra (emphasis added).
42. The "ejusdem generis" rule is that where general words follow an enumera-
tion by words with a specific meaning, such general words are to be construed
as applying only to the same general class as those specifically mentioned. BLACK'S
LAw DiCTiONARY 608 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
43. Professor Joseph Sax, the drafter of the model proposals for the EPA,
lends support to this analysis. In a recent article, he states that § 2 was not
directed to standards set by the legislature. Sax & Conner, Michigan's Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MicH. L. Rnv. 1004, 1064
(1972).
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Although the results in Lakeland and Roberts may be rendered
consistent by statutory construction, that does not resolve the issue
of whether empowering courts to change administrative standards is
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Since Roberts
involves changing legislative standards, the constitutional question
might not be resolved on appeal; the case can be decided on the basis
that section 2 (b) does not apply.44 Lakeland, however, is not presently
on appeal, so the constitutional question it presents may not be en-
countered by higher Michigan courts for some time.
To date no appellate decision has ruled on the constitutionality of
the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970. 45 It seems likely,
however, that section 2 will be upheld. First, it is the constitutionally
declared public policy of Michigan to protect the environment from
pollution,46 and any statute founded on that policy will be favored
by a strong presumption of constitutionality. Second, it is acknowl-
edged that the determination and implementation of legislative policy
is an appropriate function of the courts. Since the legislature has de-
cided that having the power to change administrative standards is a
tool required by courts to implement legislative policy, it will be
difficult for the courts to refuse to respect that decision.-7 Neverthe-
less, courts in future cases will probably be far more reluctant than
the Lakeland court to direct an administrative agency to adopt spe-
cific quantitative standards.
Janet L. Gaunt
44. The Court of Appeals of Michigan did in fact avoid the constitutional ques-
tion. There being other grounds for decision, the court held it was an error for
the trial court to decide the constitutionality of the Environmental Protection Act
of 1970. Roberts v. Michigan,-Mich. App.-, 206 N.W.2d 466, 467-68 (1973).
No mention was made of the Lakeland decision.
45. Every significant issue raised by the EPA remains unresolved by appellate
courts. Sax & Conner, supra note 43, at 1007.
46. MicH. CONST. art. IV, § 52.
47. See Note, The Constitutional Question: Vagueness and Delegation of Pow-
ers, 4 J.L. REFORm 397, 408-412 (1970).
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